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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of firm entry in Argentinian provinces. 
Panel data (from 2003 to 2008) were used to estimate the determinants of entry, which may 
be  specific  to  the  region  or  the  industry.  The  empirical  application  uses  data  from 
manufacturing firms which declare employees to Social Security. This article contributes to 
the literature on firm entry because most of previous contributions have focused on cases as 
Europe, North America or Japan, while very few empirical contributions do exist regarding 
developing countries. 
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Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es explorar los factores regionales que determinan el ingreso de 
nuevas empresas en las provincias argentinas. A tal fin, se utilizan datos de panel (para el 
período 2003 a 2008) referidos a las firmas industriales que declaran empleo a la Seguridad 
Social. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura de localización industrial existente dado que la 
mayor parte de los trabajos previos se centran en casos tales como Europa, Norteamérica o 
Japón, siendo las aplicaciones para los países en desarrollo aún escasas.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The process by which new manufacturing firms enter into markets, either grow and survive or 
exit from the industry has crucial effects on economic growth and welfare. New businesses 
may have direct and indirect effects on economic performance, both in terms of employment 
and production, but there are also several qualitative and quantitative issues that have to do 
with  securing  efficiency,  stimulating  productivity  increase,  reducing  prices,  creating  new 
markets,  stimulating  innovation,  increasing  the  variety  of  products  and  intensifying  labor 
division.  These  benefits  are  not  necessarily  limited  to  the  industry  to  which  the  start-up 
belongs, or to the region in which the entry occurs. Furthermore, Acs and Amorós (2008) find 
that entry of new firms is particularly relevant for developing economies, since innovative 
entrepreneurship leads to gap-filling and input-completing activities.  
 
Thus,  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  identify  the  determinants  of  firm  entry  in  Argentinian 
provinces, over the period 2003-2008. The aim is to approach some of the critical questions 
in  this  literature  within  the  framework  of  a  developing  economy.  Using  such  empirical 
application constitutes a clear novelty inside an empirical literature mainly centered in cases 
as Europe, North America or Japan, while very few empirical contributions do exist regarding 
developing countries. Besides, including the spatial issue as a central factor is essential in 
order to analyze a country with important regional differences in terms of wages, labor skills, 
economic  growth  rates  and  other  factors  that  influence  territorial  competitiveness.  These 
results have important policy implications in terms of the design of entry promoting policies 
and SMEs support policies in developing countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical literature on firm 
dynamics at a regional level. Section 3 describes the data set and the research methodology. 
Section 4 presents the main results and, finally, section 5 provides the main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review: determinants of firm entry at a regional level 
 
Empirical  literature  on  firm  dynamics  has  widely  demonstrated  that  there  are  huge 
differences  in  entry  rates  across  regions. In  this  sense,  there  is  an  important  number  of 
contributions that focus on such regional issues like those (among others) of Fotopoulos and 
Spence  (2001)  and  Keeble  and  Walker  (1994)  for  the  UK;  Hart  and  Gudgin  (1994)  for 
Ireland; Guesnier (1994) for France; Davidsson et al. (1994) for Sweden; Fritsch and Falck 
(2007) and Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) for Germany; Armington and Acs (2002), Rigby and 
Essletzbichler  (2000)  and  Campbell  (1996)  for  the  US;    Kangasharju  (2000)  for  Finland; 2 
Spilling (1996) for Norway; Santarelli et al. (2009), Carree et al. (2008) and Garofoli (1994) 
for Italy; Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) for Greece; Arauzo-Carod et al. (2007) for Spain or 
Tamásy and Le Heron (2008) for New Zealand. Such differences can be explained according 
to specific regional characteristics that make regions more (less) attractive to new ventures 
and, in any case, the magnitude of the effects suggests that regional dimension must be 
included in firm formation analysis
1 (Fritsch and Schmude, 2006). However, there are very 
few empirical contributions regarding developing countries. And, even though firm dynamic 
processes  present  certain  regularities  (synthesized  by  Geroski,  1995),  they  may  acquire 
particular features depending on the level of development of each country.  
 
Recently, Bosma et al. (2008) summarised such regional specific determinants into three 
main categories: i) demand and supply factors, ii) agglomeration effects and iii) cultural or 
policy environment determinants.  
 
Firstly, demand and supply factors influence both attractiveness of a region and potential 
growth of firms. Such effects have been measured by using size of local markets (proxied by 
population or population dynamics), income levels of such markets or wider areas, output 
levels or its growth rate, human capital, unemployment and unemployment dynamics and 
industry mix, among others. 
 
Secondly,  agglomeration  effects  are  demonstrated  to  be  a  key  determinant  for  the  entry 
decisions of new firms since they increase market opportunities as well as efficiency of firms 
that can benefit from such closeness with other firms. Positive effects of agglomeration have 
been widely demonstrated by scholars (see, among others, Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994), 
although there is an academic discussion regarding what benefits the most the entry of new 
firms:  localization  economies  (i.e.,  location  of  firms  of  similar  industries)  or  urbanization 
economies (i.e., location of firms of different industries). In any case it is important to take 
into account that there are also negative effects of agglomeration (diseconomies) that could 
cause congestion and rise of land prices and wages among other shortcomings.  
 
Thirdly, issues regarding policy measures and cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship 
have  been  widely  analysed.  Nevertheless,  such  issues  are  not  easy  to  be  included  into 
empirical analyses. For example, scholars use to proxy those policies by taking into account 
the amount of public spending (ideally on  infrastructures, since it may increase indirectly 
                                                 
1 Many studies reported in a special issue of the Regional Studies journal in 1994, established that 
about  70%  of  the  regional  variation  in  business  start-up  rates  can  be  explained  -at  least  in  the 
statistical  sense-  by  differences  in  economic  and  socio-demographic  characteristics  of  the  regions 
(Davidsson and Wiklund, 1997) 3 
demand for new firms) if data about specific entry-promoting policies is not available (Sutaria 
and Hicks, 2004; Reynolds et al., 1994)
2. Cultural attitudes are even more difficult to be 
measured and researchers use to rely on several proxies in order to capture such positive 
attitudes towards new firm creation. Some scholars try to capture them by taking into account 
social  structure  in  terms  of  self-employed  people  assuming  that  “areas  exhibiting  social 
mobility and having a high proportion of individuals in self employment will have higher rates 
of  new  firm  formation”  (Garofoli,  1994,  p.  388).  There  are  also  other  path-opening 
contributions that assume that cultural diversity enhances firm creation and measure such 
diversity in terms of the percentage of the population that is foreign born (Tamásy and Le 
Heron,  2008).  However,  other  studies  have  concluded  that  differences  regarding 
entrepreneurial  attitude  are  mainly  across  nations,  not  across  regions  (Davidsson  and 
Wiklund, 1997), so that researching in this field is still opened.  
 
As we have said before, previous empirical evidence is referred mainly to European regions, 
although there are also contributions about New Zealand or states of the U.S. (see, among 
others, Tamásy and Le Heron, 2008 or Armington and Acs, 2002). In any case, empirical 
findings  about  such  issues  for  developing  countries  are  scarce
3.  Another  shortcoming 
regarding the state of the art in such countries refers to extant heterogeneity among them, so 
empirical findings apply only for a narrow number of them. Nevertheless, there are some 
empirical papers that analyse the Argentinian case, although none of them at the regional 
level (Castillo et al., 2002; MTEySS, 2007; Gennero et al., 2004; Bartelsman et al., 2004). 
 
About the specificities of developing countries, Bartelsman et al. (2004) argue that in these 
countries  policies  may  give  incumbents  a  preferential  treatment,  may  artificially  increase 
barriers to entry or either make exits for some type of businesses more frequent. However, 
the  effects  of  these  distortions  are  not  clear.  Despite  these  authors  hypothesize  that 
countries where the creative destruction process is distorted in some manner will have less 
churning, the fact is that developing countries generally exhibit higher rates of rotation. 
 
Alternatively, Fritsch et al. (2006) argue that some types of distortions in market structure 
and institutions might make the entry and exit process less rational, which is, less driven by 
market fundamentals but more by random factors. They conclude this because they find that 
factors that have a statistically significant effect on survival en East Germany are fewer than 
                                                 
2 Eventually, those policy specific issues are proxied in a very different way. In this sense, Garofoli 
(1994) tries to capture what he calls “Political climate” measured by the percentage of votes obtained 
by communist and socialist parties. 
3 See an especial  issue of Small Business Economics (number 34 (1)) about  entrepreneurship at 
developing countries for a more detailed analysis of those specific cases (Naudé, 2010). 4 
those  ones  existing  in  West  Germany.  Therefore,  they  deduce  that  survival  of  new 
businesses in East Germany is subject to erratic influences to a greater extent than is true in 
the West. However, their findings could mean instead that survival, in these cases, depends 
on different variables, which have been not included in the model. 
 
Besides, macroeconomic instability and the intense cyclical variations that characterize many 
developing  countries,  might  induce  patterns  of  entry  and  exit  different  from  the  ones 
observed in developed countries
4. In addition, Caballero and Hammour (2000) point out that 
recurrent crisis are an obstacle to creative destruction, specially because of the following 
tight financial-market conditions. Another distinctive feature is that young companies usually 
have a relatively greater economic impact. That is because developed countries rely on a 
more stable and consolidated structure of firms, so that births, even in dynamic periods, 
represent a marginal portion of the employment (Davis et al., 1997; Castillo et al., 2002). 
 
Finally, unlike developed countries, Latin American firms mainly innovate through imitation or 
absorption of knowledge developed by other organizations. For this reason, Burachik (2000) 
holds that innovative entry is a very infrequent phenomenon in Latin American countries. In 
the same way, Amorós and Cristi (2008) argue that these countries have a limited number of 
nascent  ventures  under  the  model  of  “entrepreneurial  economy”  because  of  the  many 
restrictions present to create knowledge-based businesses. 
 
However,  despite  the  distinctive  features  of  developing  countries,  there  is  little  evidence 
about firm demography processes in them. As for Argentina, some authors conduct mainly 
exploratory (Bartelsman et al., 2004) or descriptive analysis (MTEySS, 2007) and they do not 
look for the determinants of the processes of firm demography. Other studies (Castillo et al., 
2002) analyze rates of employment creation and destruction and conclude that size, sector 
and age of the firms explain part of firm performance in terms of job creation and destruction. 
However, they also show significant behavior heterogeneity that can not be captured from 
the aggregated level of analysis and may be explained by regional differences. On the other 
hand, some contributions which do account for regional differences, focus in previous stages 
of firm creation process (the gestation of new business ideas) and rely on population surveys 
in which actual and potential entrepreneurs are detected (Gennero et al., 2004). 
 
                                                 
4 A research carried out by MTEySS (2007) shows that the process of birth and shutdown of plants in 
Argentina is pro-cyclical. These results contrast with those found for Portugal and Germany, where 
few evidence exists in respect to the effects that macroeconomic conditions have on the patterns of 
entry, exit and survival (Mata et al., 1995; Boeri and Bellman, 1995). 5 
According to previous considerations, our goal is to explore the determinants of firm entry in 
Argentinian  provinces,  according  to:  i)  characteristics  of  the  territories  (unemployment, 
human  capital,  entrepreneurial  attitude,  population  density,  etc.)  and  ii)  industry  specific 
variables. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
Data.  Data  of  firm  demography  (entries,  exits  and  incumbents)  is  generated  by  the 
Employment  and  Business  Dynamics  Observatory  (EBDO)  of  the  Ministry  of  Labor  and 
Social Security, from Argentina. The data covers all manufacturing firms with at least one 
employee  and  is  available  for  all  Argentinian  provinces  (23)  and  Capital  Federal
5.  This 
accounts for about 40% of total employment in Argentina (the other 60% belongs to public 
employment,  informal  employment  and  self  employed  without  employees).  Though, 
registered private sector is the one with higher productivity. It represents the most up-to-date, 
comprehensive,  reasonably  long-term  and  spatially  disaggregated  data  source  currently 
available for firm demography studies
6.  Only “local firms” were considered in each province, 
that is, firms that declare the major part of their personnel in that province. In other words, 
branch offices or subsidiaries located in other jurisdictions were excluded
7.  
 
In  this  study  we  analyze  the  whole  population  of  formal  firms,  divided  into  23  two-digit 
manufacturing industries (summarised at Table A.1 in appendix) for the 2003-2008 period. 
This period begins in 2003 because 2002 was a very atypical year, with a sharp downturn 
which followed the economic and political crisis of the ends of 2001 and the devaluation of 
January 2002. Moreover, 2008 is the last year available.  
 
Dependent variable. As we analyze firm dynamics at a regional level, we must take into 
account some regional specificities. Given that regions differ in population of firms, using 
absolute numbers of entries should be misleading (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994), so entry 
rates are used. There are some methods to standardize entries according to the size of 
respective  markets,  mainly  such  known  as  ecological  approach  (entries  standardized  by 
number  of  incumbent  firms),  population  approach  (entries  standardized  by  number  of 
                                                 
5 Buenos Aires Province is disaggregated into Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) and Rest (Bs. As. Rest), 
so that we have considered a total of 25 jurisdictions.  
6 Besides, this database recognizes changes in the firm codes that do not reflect market entries and 
exits.  That  is,  spurious  entries  and  exits  are  identified  through  a  procedure  called  "tracking 
employment", which consist of identifying the displacement of the whole personnel from firms that 
“exit” to “new” firms. 
7 This was suggested by EBDO professional staff. In this way, it prevents new entries of large firms 
appear when new offices or branches are opened in another province with only one or two people. For 
this reason, data is also less volatile. 6 
inhabitants) and labor market approach (entries standardized by number of jobs or by active 
population).  Although  most  of  researchers  assume  that  new  firms  come  from  the  extant 
population  of  business  and  then  prefer  the  ecological  approach,  there  is  no  agreement 
among scholars about the most appropriate approach (see, for instance, Garofoli, 1994 in 
support of labor market approach). In particular, in developing countries, young companies 
usually have a relatively greater economic impact, since they do not rely on a stable structure 
of  firms,  as  developed  countries  do
8.  Thus,  births  represent  a  major  portion  of  the 
employment and of the incumbent firms (Davis et al., 1997; MTEySS, 2007). As a result, 
entry rates -calculated from the ecological approach- show considerable variation between 
years as well as between regions. Because of that, in this paper we assume that it is more 
appropriate to adopt the population perspective, that is, to compute the gross entry rate as 
the ratio entries/population. This approach assumes that firms are created by the inhabitants 
of the area in which firms are located and this process is strongly influenced by local market 
expectations (Garofoli, 1994)
9. 
 
Thus, following  the  population  perspective, the dependent  variable  (GEnRit)  -Gross  Entry 
Rate  per  10.000  inhabitants-  was  calculated  by  dividing  the  number  of  establishments 
created each year at each territorial unit (Entriesit) by the number of inhabitants for the same 
period and the same jurisdiction (Populationit): (GEnRit) =  10.000 * (Entries it) / (Population it). 
 
Independent  Variables.  Data  about  characteristics  of  Argentinian  regions  come  from 
Household  Permanent  Survey,  Military  Geographical  Institute  and  own  calculations  from 
EBDO data (Table 1). As we have previously mentioned, there are many factors that may 
affect  firm  birth,  both  territorial  and  sectoral.  Table  1  displays  these  factors  (explanatory 
variables), their definition and sources.  
 
We consider that market dynamics is a complex phenomenon that has to do with entries and 
exits. Therefore, it seems necessary to take also into account the gross exit rate of firms 
(GExR)  when  explaining  entry  decisions,  as  in  Arauzo-Carod  et  al.  (2007),  for  instance. 
About this particular, there are some arguments about why to consider exit rates, like the 
replacement theory of firms that says that exits in previous periods may leave room for future 
entries (Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Audretsch, 1995).  
                                                 
8 Young companies (less than 10 years) concentrate in Argentina more than doubled employment 
than young companies in the U.S. do. Similarly, mature companies in Argentina have a share in total 
employment (56%) substantially smaller than mature U.S. companies (79%) (MTEySS, 2007). 
9 The labor market perspective, which is based on the assumption that agents decide to set up a new 
firm in the labor market where they come from and where they have had previous labor experience, 
could  have  been  be  considered  (Kangasharju,  2000;  Keeble  and  Walker,  1994;  Johnson,  1993; 
Ashcroft et al., 1991). However, data about active population by provinces is not available.  7 
As we expect more business creation in densely populated areas, due to the existence of 
stronger markets and agglomeration effects, DENSITY variable is included as usual on entry 
analysis (see Armington and Acs, 2002; Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999; Davidsson et al., 1994, 
among  others).  In  the  same  way,  to  take  into  account  negative  effects  of  too  much 
agglomeration, the square of this variable (DENSITY2) is also incorporated. The idea behind 
both variables is that agglomeration effects are like an inverted U-shape: more dense areas 
provide positive incentives and benefits to firms but if density is too high, some congestion 
problems appear that make them less attractive to economic activity.  
 
Table 1. Explanatory variables: definition and sources 
   
Variable  Definition  Expected sign  Source 
GExR  Firm exits/Annual average population  +/-  Own calculations 
from data in EBDO 
DENSITY  Annual average population/Area  + 
DENSITY2  Density squared  - 
Military 
Geographical 
Institute and HPS 
PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE  Private employees/Public employees  + 
LATE_IMMIGRATION  % of the population who have been 
born outside the province  + 
POVERTY   % of people below the poverty line.  - 
ACTIVITY_RATE  Active population/Total population  + 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE  Unemployed/Active population  +/- 
NON_REG  % of non registered workers over total 
workers  + 
SEC_SCH  % of active population with completed 
secondary school  + 
NON_ED  % of active population without formal 
instruction  - 
INDUSTRY_SHARE  Industrial firms/Total firms (formal)  + 
Own calculations 
from Household 
Permanent Survey 
(HPS)* 
LOW_BARRIERS 
MIDDLE_BARRIERS 
HIGH_BARRIERS 
% of firms in sectors with low / middle / 
high barriers. (Sum=1)  +/-  Own calculations 
from data in EBDO 
 
*Except  for  Capital,  Rest  of  Bs.  As.,  GBA,  Córdoba,  Chubut,  Entre  Ríos  and  Santa  Fe,  data  of  HPS 
correspond to the capital city of each province. Data refer to 3rd quarter of every year, except for 2007 (4th 
quarter). 
 
Source: authors 
 
 
 
Issues regarding cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship may be captured by the ratio 
private/public  employees  (PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE).  Migration  also  helps  to  explain  the 
dynamism of an economy (Tamásy and Le Heron, 2008), so we have taken into account the 
percentage  of  the  population  who  are  born  outside  the  province  (LATE_IMMIGRATION). 
Several studies have considered its importance as a source of entrepreneurial motivation. 
According to Waldinger (1986), migrants tend to be more prone to risk than people who 
remain in the place of origin, and they are usually more motivated and more adaptable to 
changes than the natives are.  8 
The income level of markets is proxied by the  variable  POVERTY, which represents the 
percentage  of  people  below  the  poverty  line.  Thus,  the  expected  sign  is  negative,  since 
markets with a low level of income may discourage the entry of new firms. This variable may 
also  proxy  access  to  capital  in  a  broad  sense.  For  instance,  Casson´s  model  (1982) 
considers not only the stock and distribution of entrepreneurial ability among the population, 
but also the proportion of able entrepreneurs who are “qualified”, that is, who have access to 
resources for backing their business decisions (Hamilton and Harper, 1994). Such control 
over resources may be gained through personal wealth, good social contacts with wealthy 
people,  or  financing  from  venture  capitalists.  Thus,  we  can  expect  that  potential 
entrepreneurs  may  have  more  difficulties  referred  to  capital  access  in  poorer  regions. 
Nevertheless, Naudé (2010) argued that poverty could have the opposite effect, since the 
“option  of  entrepreneurship  can  allow  individuals  and  households  to  escape  from  both 
absolute and relative poverty” (p.7). 
 
To  measure  the  effects  of  the  labor  market  on  firm  demography,  ACTIVITY_RATE  and 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE  can  capture  dynamism  of  regional  labor  markets  (see,  among 
others, Santarelli et al., 2009; Armington and Arcs, 2002 and Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999), 
so they were also included. Empirical studies show a twofold evidence of unemployment 
over firm entry: i) positive (on the one hand, unemployment push hypothesis showing that 
unemployed workers are more likely to be self-employed due to their current professional 
situation and, on the other hand, unemployment may imply a lower cost of labor) and ii) 
negative  (unemployment  pull  hypothesis  suggesting  that  entrepreneurial  capital  of 
unemployed workers is small, so they will not tend to create their own firms and, additionally, 
that  markets  are  weak  in  depressed  areas  with  high  unemployment  levels).  In  addition, 
instability, insecurity and dissatisfaction with the present job are also factors that may push 
individuals to start their own business (Storey, 1994). Thus, the percentage of non registered 
workers (NON_REG) was also taken into account to proxy this effect.  
 
Several scholars have demonstrated that skill level of human capital is a key determinant of 
firm  entry  (Nyström,  2007;  Fritsch,  1995).  Here  those  characteristics  are  proxied  by 
SEC_SCH and NON_ED, that is, the percentage of active population with completed high 
school and the percentage with no formal education at all, respectively. In this sense, we 
expect that higher the stock of human capital, higher the firm birth rate. Share of industrial 
firms over total firms (services, commerce and manufacturing) (INDUSTRY_SHARE) may 
also proxy the existence of necessary infrastructure for a company in the same sector be 
able  to  operate,  given  that  geographical  distribution  of  manufacturing  activity  usually 9 
complies with a certain profile of human settlements and minimum thresholds of coverage of 
services.  
 
Besides, entry rates may be affected by sectoral variables, specially barriers to entry and 
exit. In order to control for such effect, it was included -for every province- the proportion of 
firms  that  belong  to  an  industry  with  low,  middle  and  high  barriers  (LOW_BARRIERS, 
MIDDLE_BARRIERS and HIGH_BARRIERS)
10.  
 
Model. Data of firm entry over the period 2003-2008 is a panel, since we have data over time 
for the same cross section units (provinces). Panel data estimation has been used in recent 
literature on firm demography (Arauzo-Carod and Teruel, 2005; Gaygisiz and Köksal, 2003; 
Kangasharju, 2000, among others). One of its main advantages is that the bias derived from 
the non-observable heterogeneity can be controlled, which means that the richness of panel 
data obviates the need for data on things that may be difficult or impossible to measure. 
Besides,  it  provides  more  degrees  of  freedom  in  estimation  and,  therefore,  efficiency 
increases. 
 
The simplest estimator for panel data is pooled OLS, which assumes that all cross-sectional 
units have a common intercept, that is: 
GEnRit= Xitβ + α +  it 
 
However,  if  the  intercept  term  is  heterogeneous  and  if  it  is  correlated  with  the  included 
regressors,  the  OLS  estimator  will  be  biased  and  inconsistent.  In  this  case,  we  have  to 
decompose  the  unitary  pooled  error  term  ( it  =  αi  +  εit)  and  estimate  each  unit-specific 
component (αi): 
GEnRit= Xitβ + αi + εit 
 
The key issue is whether or not it is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge,  2002).  The  fixed-effects  estimator  allows  for  correlation  between  the 
unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables. It is always consistent, but at the 
cost of not being able to estimate the effect of time invariant regressors. On the other hand, 
the random effects estimator ensures that parameters for time-invariant regressors can be 
estimated, and that estimation of the parameters for time-varying regressors is carried out 
more efficiently. However, if individual effects are correlated with some explanatory variables, 
the random-effects estimator would be inconsistent, while fixed-effects estimates would still 
                                                 
10 Industries were classified according to MTEySS (2007: pp.64-65).  10 
be valid. So, we can compute the Hausman test in order to prove the consistency of the 
random effect estimator
11.  
 
4. Results 
 
In Argentina, population and firms are highly spatially concentrated around the main cities 
and,  specially,  the  capital.  About  80%  of  workers  and  firms
12  are  located  in  5  of  the  25 
jurisdictions  considered:  Gran  Buenos  Aires  and  Rest  of  Buenos  Aires  Province,  Capital 
Federal, Santa Fe and Córdoba, which represent only 22% of the surface of the country
13 
(see Table A.2 in Appendix). The main industrial sector in terms of number of employees is 
Manufacture  of  food  products  and  beverages,  followed  by  Other  non-metallic  mineral 
products, Chemicals and chemical products, Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and 
Machinery and equipment (Table A.1 in Appendix). Except for the first one, which is the most 
uniformly distributed industry along the country, most industries are concentrated in certain 
regions, due to several historical reasons (Carlevari and Carlevari, 2003). 
 
A first insight into firm dynamics during the period 2003-2008 for the whole country (Table 2), 
shows that firm entries have maintained around 5.000 new start-ups per year while exiting 
firms have doubled from 2.330 in 2003 to more than 5.000 in 2008. This important increase 
on exiting firms is the result of typical market dynamics in years with high GDP growth after a 
deep crisis: in expansive periods entry rates usually increase, specially after a crisis like the 
one that affected Argentina between 1999 and 2002. When the national market begins to 
grow again (although slowly), there is a flood of entrants (whose entry was delayed by the 
crisis)  as  well  as  new  business  which  are  favored  by  the  new  macroeconomic  regime. 
MTEySS (2007) reports that in 2003-2005 the entry rate reached the highest value in the last 
10 years and, because of the process of firm dynamics, it was likely that in the next periods 
market selection mechanisms produce an adjustment in the stock of firms, which is shown 
here. Nevertheless, apart from economic cycles, it is remarkable that entries represent more 
than 10% of total incumbents in all the years of the period. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See Mundlak (1975) for details. 
12 It refers to private and formal firms from the EBDO database. 
13 These five jurisdictions also concentrate 62% of the population, 75% of expenditures in science and 
technology activities, 77% of university degrees, 62% of universities, 85% of exports of manufactured 
products, 71% of the GDP and 80% of manufacturing value added in 2003. 11 
Table 2. Entry, exit and incumbent firms (2003 – 2008) 
   
Year  Entry  Exit  Incumbents 
2003  4.986  2.330  42.754 
2004  5.994  2.326  45.234 
2005  5.486  2.929  48.317 
2006  6.264  3.623  49.987 
2007  5.886  4.358  51.796 
2008  5.389  5.103  52.417 
 
Source: own calculations from data in EBDO 
 
Graph 1
14 displays the evolution of the Gross Entry Rate over the period, as well as the 
Gross Exit Rate (per 10.000 inhabitants, GExR), the Net Entry Rate (NER= GEnR – GExR) 
and the Firm Turnover Rate (FTR= GEnR+ GExR). 
 
Graph 1: Entry, Exit, Net Entry and Turnover Rates 
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GEnR: Gross Entry Rate; GExR: Gross Exit Rate; FTR: Firm Turnover Rate; NER: Net Entry Rate 
 
 
Table 2 displays entry and exit rates at a province level for 2003 and 2008. (Figure 1 in 
appendix shows entry and exit rates at a province level for the whole period). For this period 
of time net entry rates decrease considerable due to an important increase on exit rates 
(from 0,632 new firms per 10.000 inhabitants in 2003 to 1,316 in 2008), even though entry 
rates slightly increase (from 1,353 to 1,390).  
 
 
                                                 
14 Graph 1 shows some measures according to population approach and it does not differ significantly 
from the one showing the same results according to the ecological perspective. Nevertheless, regional 
rates do differ between the two perspectives, given that population is more homogeneously distributed 
across Argentinian regions than firms are. 12 
Table 2. Entry and exit rates by provinces (2003 and 2008) 
   
  2003  2008 
Province  Stock  Entry  Exit  GEnR  GExR  Stock  Entry  Exit  GEnR  GExR 
Bs. As. (Rest)  4.888  597  251  1,143  0,480  5.981  637  623  1,161  1,136 
Capital  8.787  1.101  611  4,007  2,223  10.516  1.080  1.149  4,056  4,315 
Catamarca  151  19  10  0,548  0,288  177  13  18  0,335  0,464 
Córdoba  3.803  489  216  1,569  0,693  4.886  552  493  1,687  1,506 
Corrientes  240  48  25  0,503  0,262  341  57  36  0,554  0,350 
Chaco  376  48  22  0,476  0,218  449  82  49  0,753  0,450 
Chubut  312  45  22  1,065  0,521  383  50  48  1,104  1,059 
Entre Ríos  947  129  52  1,092  0,440  1.233  154  93  1,227  0,741 
Formosa  88  19  15  0,379  0,299  125  17  13  0,308  0,236 
GBA  12.413  1.213  557  1,378  0,633  15.107  1.343  1.384  1,463  1,508 
Jujuy  170  13  7  0,207  0,111  200  36  17  0,526  0,248 
La Pampa  241  23  8  0,752  0,262  298  24  23  0,734  0,703 
La Rioja  116  7  7  0,231  0,231  131  14  14  0,406  0,406 
Mendoza  1.866  225  122  1,400  0,759  2.260  224  222  1,321  1,310 
Misiones  820  143  28  1,435  0,281  1.015  109  95  0,994  0,866 
Neuquén  251  33  14  0,675  0,286  337  52  41  0,968  0,763 
Río Negro  388  47  22  0,839  0,393  460  80  51  1,370  0,873 
Salta  327  35  26  0,314  0,233  403  60  49  0,484  0,395 
San Juan  510  44  21  0,692  0,330  591  51  51  0,744  0,744 
San Luis  384  26  25  0,680  0,654  407  35  37  0,812  0,859 
Santa Cruz  103  16  9  0,787  0,442  132  19  15  0,846  0,668 
Santa Fe  4.785  573  212  1,889  0,699  5.964  530  482  1,690  1,537 
Santiago  203  24  10  0,290  0,121  248  31  20  0,344  0,222 
T. del Fuego  123  15  6  1,400  0,560  149  15  21  1,170  1,638 
Tucumán  462  54  32  0,394  0,233  624  124  59  0,838  0,399 
TOTAL  42.754  4.986  2.330  1,353  0,632  52.417  5.389  5.103  1,390  1,316 
 
Source: authors with data from EBDO. 
 
The spatial distribution of such entry and exit rates shows that there is not a clear positive 
effect of the surrounding areas of the capital of the country (GBA and Rest of Buenos Aires 
province), since entry rates are around the mean (and even below  it) and exit rates are 
around the mean too. Nevertheless, there is a huge concentration of entries and exits at the 
capital city, where such rates (data from 2008) multiply per 3 the average of the country. 
 
Results. Correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables are shown in 
Table 4, and most of them have the expected sign. Summary statistics of the these variables 
are displayed in Table 5.   
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables  
  GEnR  GExR  DENS.  DENS.2 
POVER
TY 
PRIVATE
_EMPL. 
LATE_ 
IMM. 
ACT._ 
RATE 
UNEMP.
_RATE 
NON_ 
REG 
SEC_ 
SCH 
NON_ 
ED 
IND._ 
SHARE 
LOW_ 
BARR. 
MIDDLE
_BARR. 
HIGH_
BARR. 
GEnR  1,000                              
GExR  0,872  1,000                            
DENSITY   0,823  0,794  1,000                          
DENSITY2  0,810  0,783  0,989  1,000                        
POVERTY  -0,437  -0,544  -0,242  -0,248  1,000                      
PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE  0,518  0,506  0,341  0,275  -0,196  1,000                    
LATE_IMMIGRATION  0,188  0,169  0,055  0,051  -0,489  -0,249  1,000                  
ACTIVITY_RATE  0,677  0,623  0,548  0,522  -0,509  0,381  0,347  1,000                
UNEMPL._RATE  0,057  -0,129  0,042  0,008  0,489  0,245  -0,273  0,222  1,000              
NON_REG  -0,279  -0,361  -0,159  -0,175  0,695  0,020  -0,597  -0,339  0,334  1,000            
SEC_SCH  -0,059  0,071  -0,109  -0,114  -0,437  -0,150  0,399  -0,006  -0,322  -0,444  1,000          
NON_ED  -0,167  -0,196  -0,189  -0,206  0,369  -0,053  -0,230  -0,343  0,162  0,238 -0,153  1,000        
INDUSTRY_SHARE  0,335  0,270  0,206  0,094  0,119  0,580  -0,129  0,177  0,249  0,229 -0,193  0,111  1,000      
LOW_BARRIERS  0,666  0,682  0,845  0,831  -0,203  0,290  -0,030  0,509  0,089  -0,041 -0,071  -0,229  0,230  1,000    
MIDDLE_BARRIERS  -0,686  -0,629  -0,523  -0,466  0,363  -0,578  -0,242  -0,705  -0,187  0,147  0,032  0,145  -0,484  -0,569  1,000  
HIGH_BARRIERS  0,537  0,464  0,275  0,214  -0,345  0,561  0,295  0,623  0,183  -0,156 -0,009  -0,078  0,475  0,266  -0,944  1,000 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics for variables for regressions
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Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
GEnR  150  1,081  0,844  0,207  5,321 
GExR  150  0,660  0,607  0,078  4,315 
DENSITY  150  649,945  2680,305  0,834  13739,750 
DENSITY2  150  7,56E+06  3,60E+07  0,695  1,89E+08 
POVERTY  147  0,323  0,169  0,022  0,687 
PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE  147  3,248  1,589  1,098  9,145 
LATE_IMMIGRATION  147  0,197  0,127  0,053  0,619 
ACTIVITY_RATE  147  0,431  0,041  0,335  0,539 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE  147  0,084  0,040  0,010  0,190 
NON_REG  147  0,438  0,100  0.135  0,600 
SEC_SCH  147  0,226  0,032  0,136  0,322 
NON_ED  147  0,006  0,004  0,000  0,020 
INDUSTRY_SHARE  150  0,094  0,038  0,049  0,253 
LOW_BARRIERS  150  0,056  0,044  0,003  0,247 
MIDDLE_BARRIERS  150  0,626  0,129  0,332  0,841 
HIGH_BARRIERS  150  0,318  0,110  0,095  0,549 
 
The results of the econometric estimation are presented in Table 6. The F test, which rejects 
the hypothesis that the intercept terms are invariant across provinces, was used. Therefore, 
panel data were estimated because they take into account the variance of the intercept. The 
choice of whether estimate “random” or “fixed” panel data is made through the Hausman 
test. A fixed effect model was applied because we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
in both models are similar, and consequently, random-effect estimator would be inconsistent 
(individual effects are supposed to be correlated with some explanatory variables). Besides, 
the panel comprises observations on a fixed and relatively small set of units of interest (all 
Argentinian provinces) and we are not interested in making inferences beyond the sample. 
 
 
                                                 
15  In  variables  taken  from  the  Household  Permanent  Survey,  the  number  of  observations  is  147 
because Río Negro Province was included in such survey only from year 2005. 14 
The dependent variable is the Gross Entry Rate (GEnRit), following the population approach. 
The negative and significant coefficient of the GExRit shows that entry and exit are inversely 
related within provinces. This shows that entries and exits of markets are not independent 
processes (ceteris paribus the features of the productive structure of firms in each province, 
proxied  by  LOW_BARRIERSit  and  MIDDLE_BARRIERSit).  This  result  confirms  previous 
findings of Günalp and Cilasun (2006) for Turkey regarding a negative effect of past exits 
over current entries, but contrasts with Arauzo-Carod et al. (2007), Arauzo-Carod and Teruel 
(2005), Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Love (1996), who find that entry and exit rates are 
positively  related  within  Spanish  regions,  Spanish  municipalities,  Texas  Metropolitan  and 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs and PMSAs) and British counties, respectively. 
Since interaction of entries and exits seem to vary according to the development level of the 
economy, it is possible that while for developed economies higher exit rates imply leaving 
room for new entries, for developing economies (not yet saturated) higher exit rates imply 
structural weakness of local markets that make them less attractive for new firms. Besides, it 
is likely that, along this period of economic growth, entries have increased in all regions, but, 
while some provinces are more capable of attracting and maintaining new firms (and have, 
consequently, high entry rates and low exit rates) other provinces rather drive them out (and 
have low entry rates and high exit rates).  
 
Table 6. Estimates of effects of regional characteristics on GEnR 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Number of obs = 147  Obs per group: min  3 
Number of groups = 25  Avg  5,9 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2949  Max  6 
between = 0.6119  F(14,108)    3,23 
overall = 0.5905  Prob > F    0,0003 
           
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  [95% Conf.Interval] 
GExR  -0,436  0,106  -4,120  0,000  -0,646  -0,226 
DENSITY  0,005  0,003  1,470  0,145  -0,002  0,011 
DENSITY2  -2,44E-07  0,000  -2,000  0,048  0,000  0,000 
POVERTY  -0,966  0,261  -3,700  0,000  -1,484  -0,448 
PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE  -0,014  0,032  -0,440  0,664  -0,078  0,050 
LATE_IMMIGRATION  -0,511  1,183  -0,430  0,667  -2,856  1,835 
ACTIVITY_RATE  2,360  1,044  2,260  0,026  0,291  4,429 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE  -0,650  1,053  -0,620  0,538  -2,737  1,436 
NON_REG  0,632  0,294  2,150  0,034  0,050  1,214 
SEC_SCH  -0,771  0,834  -0,920  0,358  -2,424  0,883 
NON_ED  12,451  5,554  2,240  0,027  1,441  23,461 
INDUSTRY_SHARE  0,445  5,837  0,080  0,939  -11,125  12,015 
LOW_BARRIERS (1)  0,434  2,368  0,180  0,855  -4,259  5,127 
MIDDLE_BARRIERS (1)  0,053  1,067  0,050  0,961  -2,062  2,167 
CONSTANT  -0,524  1,814  -0,290  0,773  -4,120  3,072 
(1) Note: base category: HIGH_BARRIERS  
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 108) =     10,27           Prob > F = 0,0000 
Hausman test:             Chi-Sq. (14) = 278,22           Prob > Chi Sq = 0,0000 
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DENSITYit  (associated  with  the  benefits  of  a  bigger  market  and  the  existence  of 
agglomeration economies) is positive but not significant. These results agree with those of 
Audretsch and Fritsch (1994), Guesnier (1994) and Gaygisiz and Köksal (2003). However, 
the negative effects of a high level of agglomeration (DENSITY2it) are significant, implying 
that diseconomies like congestion, higher wages and land prices, among others, discourage 
entry of new firms.  
 
The income level of the province (proxied by POVERTYit)
16 is also significant and has the 
expected sign, which means that higher the poverty level of the region, lower is the entry rate 
of new firms. It should be noted that this variable may also proxy some characteristics of 
human capital of the province, especially when it is long-term poverty. 
 
Our results regarding the ACTIVITY_RATEit show that the creation of new firms is positively 
influenced by the existence of a pool of potential entrepreneurs (Fritsch and Falck, 2007), so 
it  seems  that  such  availability  of  labor  is  a  necessary  condition  for  new  firm  creation. 
According  to  our  results  there  is  no  evidence  on  the  so-called  “unemployment  push 
hypothesis”,  given  that  the  unemployment  variable  (UNEMPLOYMENT_RATEit)  is  neither 
positive nor significant. This is not a surprising result, since many unemployed people start 
their business in the informal sector, and those new firms are not included in our database. 
The model also shows that labor instability (NON_REGit) push individuals to start their own 
business. 
 
Variables  that  proxy  cultural  attitudes  were  not  significant
17.  This  may  suggest  that 
differences  regarding  entrepreneurial  attitude  might  be  mainly  across  nations,  not  across 
regions (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1997) or, on the contrary, that those differences could be 
significant  among  areas  smaller  than  provinces,  such  as  cities.  However, Gennero  et  al. 
(2004) do not find a significant influence of migration on gestation rates of new firms among 
cities in Argentina. In any case, in some empirical studies (mentioned by Davidsson and 
Wiklund, 1997), it was found that cultural and economic-structural determinants of the new 
firm formation rate were positively correlated, so that the unique contribution of each type of 
explanation could not be determined.  
 
                                                 
16 INDIGENCE was also highly significant in alternative specifications. Results can be obtained upon 
request. 
17  In  other  specifications  other  variables  that  proxied  the  same  concepts  were  included  (the 
percentage  of  population  who  comes  from  outside  the  province  in  the  last  five  years  and  the 
percentage of self-employed people) and none of them was significant. Results can be obtained upon 
request. 16 
Characteristics  of  human  capital  were  not  significant  and  neither  had  the  expected  sign, 
which means that the availability of skilled labor do not influence entry decisions
18. However, 
the model shows that as the percentage of population without formal education increases, 
gross entry rates also increases. We think there may be more entries in regions with lower 
education because of industry factors that the model fails to control
19. The variable used to 
proxy  the  existence  of  the  necessary  infrastructure  for  a  manufacturing  firm  to  operate 
(INDUSTRY_SHAREit) was not significant
2021.  
 
If we suspect that there is heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic error term, εit, we could 
compute  robust  standard  errors.  Table  A.3  (see  Appendix)  displays  these  results.  It  is 
remarkable that DENSITYit is significant and has the expected sign; that is, provinces more 
densely populated are expected to have more entry of firms, ceteris paribus. As this paper is 
a result of a work still in progress, further research needs to be done in order to improve the 
estimated model. 
 
Fixed effects may also be taken into account in an OLS regression with dummy variables 
that are specific for each province. Even though estimated coefficients for the independent 
variables are the same, individual effects may be recovered and estimated. These results are 
shown in Table 7. Ceteris paribus, more entry rate is expected in Córdoba and Santa Fe, in 
comparison to Rest of Buenos Aires Province (base category). Concretely, these are the 
provinces  relatively  more  developed  among  the  ones  that  have  statistically  significant 
individual effects. Additionally, for the rest of the provinces in Table 7 (which are lagging 
behind) less entry rate is expected (ceteris paribus).  These results show that there are still 
some variables (non included in the model and maybe non observable) that cause higher 
entry rates in those provinces which are relatively more developed. 
 
 
                                                 
18 This could be explained because industry requires different kinds of skilled workers (people with 
high school, professionals, etc.). Thus, several variables were included in the model -proportion of 
people with a degree, percentage of people who finished high school plus people with uncompleted 
degree, among others- but none of them was significant. 
19 In further research, alternative measures of barriers to entry should be considered. 
20 In alternative specifications, in which we could not separate GBA from the Rest of Buenos Aires 
Province, other variables regarding characteristics of infrastructure were included: km of roads, roads 
per km
2, number of universities and number of public and private graduates per year. In any case, 
none of them was significant. Results can be obtained upon request. 
21 Policy measures may also affect the entry of new firms. In Argentina, in 1973 a policy of industrial 
promotion began, which granted benefits to companies that settle in the provinces of Catamarca, La 
Rioja, San Luis, San Juan and Tierra del Fuego. However, the fixed effect estimator is not able to 
estimate  the  effect  of  time  invariant  regressors.  Nevertheless,  Gatto  (2007)  shows  that  territorial 
inequalities, as well as the pattern distribution of firms, have not significantly changed until today. 17 
Table 7. Estimated individual effects (only statistically significant) 
   
Number of obs = 147             F( 38, 108)   90.02
R-squared  0.9694            Prob > F  0.0000
Adj R-squared  0.9586            Root MSE  0.17866
           
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  [95% Conf. Interval]
         
Catamarca  -0,651  0,232  -2,802  -1,111  -0,190 -0,651
Chaco  -0,567  0,284  -1,992  -1,130  -0,003 -0,567
Córdoba  0,781  0,228  3,431  0,330  1,233 0,781
Corrientes  -0,499  0,276  -1,812  -1,045  0,047 -0,499
Formosa  -0,744  0,318  -2,34  -1,373  -0,114 -0,744
Jujuy  -0,893  0,183  -4,884  -1,256  -0,531 -0,893
La Rioja  -0,866  0,223  -3,883  -1,308  -0,424 -0,866
Salta  -0,715  0,219  -3,266  -1,148  -0,281 -0,715
Santa Fe  0,916  0,355  2,582  0,213  1,620 0,916
Santiago  -0,851  0,276  -3,083  -1,398  -0,304 -0,851
Tucumán  -0,870  0,245  -3,553  -1,355  -0,385 -0,870
         
Note: Base category: Rest of Bs. As. province 
 
 
Finally, as usual in spatial analysis, we tried to detect spatial correlation among provinces. 
That is, we intended to examine the extent to which the establishment of new concerns in a 
particular site is driven by the characteristics of that particular site and/or by the (average) 
characteristics of the surrounding area. Different spatial neighbour matrixes were used, but 
no spatial correlation was detected, because of the extended size of Argentinian provinces. 
 
 
 5. Conclusions 
 
The  primary  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  analyse  regional  determinants  of  firm  entry  in  a 
developing  country.  This  paper  contributes  to  extant  literature  on  firm  demography  by 
analysing the specific case of a developing economy, for which the empirical evidence is still 
scarce. Through the paper, we have shown that entry determinants are not exactly the same 
as in developed economies, where there is a well-established list of economic, demographic 
and institutional characteristics that determine entry decisions of new firms. In particular, we 
found a negative effect of exit rate on entry rate and a significant influence of poverty and 
non-registered  employment.  Besides,  some  variables  that  usually  explain  entry  rates  in 
developed  countries  were  not  significant.  These  findings  insinuate,  like  in  Fritsch  et  al. 
(2006), that determinants of entry and exit process in developing countries may differ from 
the ones identified in developed nations. Even if acknowledging that Argentinian case could 
differ from other developing economies, it seems clear that the phenomenon is not the same 
as in Europe, Japan or the U.S.. Additionally, such disparities could suggest to use different 18 
econometric techniques than in previous analysis, given the considerable differences among 
them. 
 
Further extensions of this work should point to solve some specific shortcomings identified 
here  and  should  advance  our  understanding  about  entry  processes  in  a  developing 
economy.  Some  of  those  extensions  include  the  possibility  of  incorporating  additional 
sectoral  variables,  as  well  as  the  estimation  of  the  joint  influence  of  several  variables. 
Besides, it could be tested the effect of the explanatory variables over different sort of firms 
(specially domestic and foreign firms). Another shortcoming to be solved is about how to deal 
with  an  uneven  distribution  of  economic  activity  across  the  country  due  to  a  huge 
concentration around its capital, which is a typical situation of a developing country. 
 
Finally, regarding policy implications, this analysis suggests that policy measures to be taken 
in developing economies are not necessarily the same than in more developed economies. 
Therefore,  policy  makers  should  take  into  account  country  specificities  before  designing 
entry-promoting policies and not only follow previous ones adopted in those countries. In 
particular,  given  the  effect  that  poverty  has  on  regional  entry  rates,  it  seems  that  entry 
promotion policies should be more comprehensive, taking into account possible effects of 
poverty  and  long-term  unemployment  on  human  capital  and  market  dynamics  in  certain 
provinces. The point is that both variables not only mean low income but also low education, 
barriers to external funding and smaller innovative behaviour. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Entry and exit rates at province level (all the years) 
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Source: authors from data in EBDO 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Industry classification    
  Year 2008 
Code  Industry  % firms  %employees 
15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  22,6%  26,6% 
16  Manufacture of tobacco products  0,0%  0,4% 
17  Manufacture of textiles  4,9%  5,5% 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  6,8%  4,5% 
19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear  3,0%  3,3% 
20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials  5,9%  3,2% 
21  Manufacture of paper and paper products  1,5%  2,5% 
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  6,9%  4,8% 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  0,1%  0,5% 
24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  4,1%  7,0% 
25  Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  5,3%  5,4% 
26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  3,3%  3,4% 
27  Manufacture of basic metals  2,1%  3,5% 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment  14,4%  8,7% 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  5,8%  5,9% 
30  Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  0,3%  0,3% 
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  1,9%  1,9% 
32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus  0,2%  0,4% 
33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks  1,0%  0,7% 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  2,8%  6,7% 
35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  0,8%  1,0% 
36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  5,7%  3,4% 
37  Recycling  0,3%  0,3% 
Note: Data = Entry + Incumbent - Exit     
     
Source: International Standard Industrial Classification. Rev. 3     
 
 
 
Table A.2. Regional concentration in Argentina. Year 2003. 
             
 Variable  Capital 
Federal 
Buenos Aires 
(GBA+Rest)  Córdoba  Santa Fe  Rest of 
country  TOTAL 
Area  0% 11% 6% 5% 78%  100%
Population  7% 38% 8% 8% 38%  100%
Number of firms  20% 40% 9% 11% 19%  100%
Number of industrial employees  18% 41% 8% 12% 21%  100%
Value Added  21% 34% 8% 8% 29%  100%
Industrial Value Added  19% 47% 6% 7% 20%  100%
Graduates  35% 21% 14% 7% 23%  100%
Universities  27% 20% 6% 9% 38%  100%
Exports of primary products and energy  0% 28% 11% 9% 52%  100%
Exports of manufacturing  19% 47% 6% 7% 20%  100%
R&D expenditures  28% 32% 8% 7% 25%  100%
   
Source: authors from EBDO, Household Permanent Survey, National Institute of Statistics and Census yearbook and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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Table A.3. Estimates of effects of regional characteristics on GenR
22.  
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Number of obs = 147  Obs per group: min  3 
Number of groups = 25  avg  5,9 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2949  max  6 
between = 0.6119  F(13,24)    11,15 
overall = 0.5905  Prob > F    0,00000 
 
  Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.  t  P>t  [95% Conf.Interval] 
GExR  -0,436  0,118  -3,69  0,001  -0,680  -0,192 
DENSITY  0,005  0,002  2,13  0,044  0,000  0,009 
DENSITY2  -2,44E-07  0,000  -2,59  0,016  0,000  0,000 
POVERTY  -0,966  0,331  -2,92  0,007  -1,649  -0,284 
PRIVATE_EMPLOYEE  -0,014  0,019  -0,74  0,466  -0,053  0,025 
LATE_IMMIGRATION  -0,511  1,026  -0,50  0,623  -2,628  1,607 
ACTIVITY_RATE  2,360  0,693  3,41  0,002  0,931  3,789 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE  -0,650  0,776  -0,84  0,410  -2,251  0,951 
NON_REG  0,632  0,369  1,71  0,100  -0,131  1,394 
SEC_SCH  -0,771  0,879  -0,88  0,390  -2,586  1,044 
NON_ED  12,451  5,070  2,46  0,022  1,987  22,915 
INDUSTRY_SHARE  0,445  6,604  0,07  0,947  -13,185  14,076 
LOW_BARRIERS (1)  0,434  1,863  0,23  0,818  -3,412  4,280 
MIDDLE_BARRIERS (1)  0,053  0,815  0,06  0,949  -1,629  1,734 
CONSTANT  -0,524  1,363  -0,38  0,704  -3,336  2,288 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The F test of ui=0 is suppressed because it is too difficult to compute the robust form of the statistic 
when there more than a few panels (StataCorp., 2007).   